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Introduction
One of the most significant challenges that the ICC has faced since its creation in 2002 has been that of securing State cooperation. The ICC, much like the ICTY and ICTR (ad hoc Tribunals), which preceded the Court's establishment, relies heavily on the cooperation of States for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes that fall within its jurisdiction. 1 The ICC Statute identifies a number of ways in which the ICC is dependent on States, from the arrest and surrender of suspects to the preservation of evidence and the protection of victims and witnesses. 2 In its short period of operation, the failure of States to cooperate with the ICC has frustrated the Court's proceedings significantly.
This chapter examines the relationship between non-cooperation and the efficiency to demonstrate the significant impact that non-cooperation has had on the ability of the Court to seek justice for the crimes that fall within its jurisdiction, and to do so efficiently and effectively. The chapter goes on to consider the potential for the inefficiency of the ICC, conversely, to affect the willingness of States to cooperate with the Court. It argues that the relationship between efficiency and non-cooperation can be understood to have a cyclical dimension, whereby inefficiency within the ICC could encourage noncooperation from States, which could, in turn, produce further inefficiency. The cycle is one that must be addressed from within the ICC and the Court's legislative and management body, the ASP, by taking measures to encourage efficiency in all aspects of the Court's operation, including responses to non-cooperation. It concludes by highlighting measures that are currently being taken to this end.
The impact of non-cooperation on the efficiency of the International Criminal Court
The ICC's battle with non-cooperation was anticipated even before the Court came into operation. 3 The difficulties faced by the ad hoc Tribunals had already demonstrated the importance of State support for the pursuit of international criminal justice in an international system without its own enforcement agency. The ad hoc Tribunals were theoretically in a strong position to secure the cooperation of States, having been established under the UNSC's Chapter VII powers under the UN Charter and, consequently, having the benefit of recourse to sanctions from the UNSC in the event that States failed to cooperate. 4 Nonetheless, the tribunals experienced 'considerable resistance and obstruction' from States, including those who were not directly involved in the relevant conflicts. 5 Their struggle for cooperation, particularly in relation to the arrest and surrender of high level accused, 6 has extended the lifespan of the institutions significantly.
The ICC is in a far weaker position than the ad hoc Tribunals in securing the cooperation of States. This is due to the fact that the legal basis of the Court lies in a multilateral treaty, as opposed to the Chapter VII UN Charter powers of the UNSC. The treaty basis of the ICC has several implications. Firstly, whilst all States were bound to cooperate 3 Cassese, 'The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections' (1999) supra n 1 at 164. 4 Rastan, 'Testing Co-operation: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities ' (2008) (2014) Final Final 
A. The efficiency of the Court's operation
The relationship between the efficiency of the ICC and levels of State cooperation is significant in light of theories about why States comply with international law. Different factors have been understood to influence the willingness of States to comply with their international legal obligations, including the threat of sanctions, the protection of national interests, concerns about reciprocity and reputation, the operation of domestic courts, the feasibility and cost of compliance, and the clarity and perceived legitimacy of the relevant rules. 42 One factor that is frequently highlighted in academic literature on State compliance with international law is the reputational cost of non-compliance. 43 This factor is particularly important at the ICC, given the inability of the Court to formally sanction States that fail to comply with its requests for cooperation, beyond a judicial finding of non-cooperation. 44 The reputational cost of non-compliance with the ICC's requests for cooperation is logically tied to the international reputation of the ICC. The more efficient, impartial, fair and legitimate the ICC is perceived to be, the greater the reputational cost that States are likely to suffer if they fail to comply with the Court's requests for cooperation. 45 The Another way in which the ICC can help to counteract perceptions of inefficiency is by developing measures of the Court's progress that do not depend solely on final judgments of the Trial Chamber. Given the size and complexity of cases involving the commission of international crimes, and their ability to be stalled through the noncooperation of States, it is important to highlight other markers of productivity, such as the completion of interim stages of pre-trial and trial proceedings, the numbers of victims that have participated in the Court's proceedings, and so on. Section 4 will note current efforts being undertaken to this end.
B. Efficiency in responding to instances of non-cooperation
In order to exploit the reputational costs of non-compliance, it is necessary not only to enhance the reputation of the ICC, but also to respond to instances of non-compliance in a timely and decisive manner. Prompt action is required in order to garner the support of The ICC has received criticism for its failure to take decisive action in response to instances of non-cooperation in its early years of operation. The concerns relate largely to the Prosecutor's reaction to uncooperative States. The approach of the Prosecutor is important, given that the he or she is 'the most visible and vital actor both inside and outside the tribunal's courtrooms' and 'the official who is most responsible for leading the Court's effort to prod targeted states to cooperate'. 55 The OTP is in a much stronger position to identify instances of non-cooperation than the Court's defence counsel because of its access to information during preliminary examinations and the early stages of the Court's investigations. 56 Criticisms have been raised in light of the Prosecutor's approach to non-cooperation in both of the situations discussed above (Darfur and Kenya). 57 Sluiter has questioned the Prosecutor's delay in informing the Pre-Trial Chamber of Sudan's failure to cooperate with the Court's investigations in Darfur, given that instances of non-cooperation occurred prior to the issuance of the Court's arrest warrants and that Sudan had 'always openly expressed its dissatisfaction with the Court and its intention not to cooperate'. 58 The Prosecutor's approach prevented the Pre-Trial Chamber from formally notifying the UNSC of Sudan's non-compliance in a timely manner. 59 In relation to the Situation in Kenya, the Prosecutor has, again, been reprimanded for failing to react quickly enough to non-compliance with the Court's requests for cooperation. In response to the Prosecutor's request for a finding of non-cooperation against the Kenyan Government in the case of Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the Trial Chamber of the ICC criticised the Prosecutor's delay in following up on the Kenyan Government's compliance with the relevant cooperation request. 60 The Chamber stressed:
[T]he issue of the Kenyan Government's cooperation with the Records Request should have been addressed at a much earlier stage; doing so would, to a significant degree, have mitigated the impact that the non-compliance has had on the proceedings in this case. 61 It was against this background, and more general concerns about the timeliness and thoroughness of Prosecution investigations in the case against Kenyatta, that the Trial Chamber refused to adjourn the case until the Kenyan Government had complied with the cooperation request and decided not to refer the matter to the ASP. 62 In its Judgment, reversing the Trial Chamber's decision on Kenya's failure to cooperate, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that "the conduct of the requesting party, in this case the Prosecutor, may… be a relevant factor [in considering the failure of a State to cooperate or the appropriateness of referring a matter of non-cooperation to the ASP under Article 87(7) of the ICC Statute] if the actions of the requesting party have negatively impacted the requested State's ability to cooperate". 63 The risk for the Prosecutor -and the ICC more generally -in taking a decisive approach to non-cooperation is that it could lead States to become more resistant to the ICC's investigations. 64 The Court's investigations in Darfur and Kenya have, however, shown that a lenient approach to non-cooperation may not only fail to encourage States to cooperate with the Court, but that it may also undermine the perception of the ICC as a strong institution that can respond effectively to instances of non-compliance. Whilst each situation is different, the examples of Darfur and Kenya suggest that tolerance of non-cooperation may be more damaging to the Prosecutor's cause than decisive action.
In order to promote cooperation with the ICC's investigations, it is important that the In order for the ICC to succeed in bringing perpetrators to justice for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, a prompt and consistent response is required from both within and beyond the ICC. Whilst measures can be taken to improve the Court's responsiveness to instances of non-cooperation, the ICC will remain reliant on States, international and regional organisations, and civil society to support its activities by taking firm diplomatic, and, where possible, coercive, action against uncooperative States. The UNSC must take a firm approach to non-cooperation in relation to situations that it has referred to the ICC, which not only concern grave international crimes but, by definition, constitute threats to international peace and security. 67
Towards a more efficient and effective International Criminal Court
In the sections above it has been argued that just as non-cooperation can have a negative 
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A. Improving the efficiency of the International Criminal Court
The ASP has been focusing on the efficiency of the ICC for a number of years. Following its establishment, the Study Group invited the ICC to undertake a review of lessons learnt in the first ten years of the Court's operation, with a view to identifying measures that could be taken to expedite judicial proceedings and enhance their efficiency. 69 In light of the discussion in Section 3.A. above, it is also important to note that the Registrar has been working on the development of benchmarks or indicators to measure the performance of the Registry and has recognised 'a wider question as to the possibility of such indicators for the Court as a whole'. 77 The OTP has also developed performance indicators to help assess its operation and the implementation of its Strategic Plan. 78 Such indicators could play a useful role in presenting a more nuanced account of the ICC's operation than assessments that focus solely on the Court's final decisions and help to strengthen the Court's international reputation by providing reassurance as to its productivity. 79 18 the Court's requests for cooperation will not be condoned and to avoid any ambiguity as to whether or not certain States have complied with their legal obligations. 86 In order to strengthen the ICC's cooperation regime and increase the reputational damage that stems from non-cooperation it is crucial that all relevant actors, including the ICC, the ASP and the UNSC, respond promptly and consistently to instances of noncooperation.
B. Expediting responses to non-cooperation
Conclusion
It has been argued elsewhere that '[t]he inability [of the ICC] to arrest accused leaders for instance -as in Sudan -is a failure of political will, and not a failure of international criminal justice.' 87 The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that the failure of States to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of suspects, or other forms of cooperation, must be viewed, at least in part, as a failure of international criminal justice, and a failure of the ICC. This is due to the relationship between the reputation of the ICC and the willingness of States and other institutions to support and cooperate with its investigations.
In order to enhance levels of State cooperation, the Court must prove itself to be an efficient and effective mechanism, capable of rendering fair and impartial justice in the aftermath of the commission of international crimes. By bolstering its reputation, the Court can encourage greater levels of support for its activities and deter instances of noncooperation by increasing the reputational costs that they entail. A reduction in instances of non-cooperation can, in turn, enhance the efficiency of the ICC and encourage greater international support for its operation in a cyclical fashion. It is also important that the ICC responds quickly and consistently to instances of non-cooperation. A prompt response is necessary in order to exploit the reputational costs of non-compliance and increase the pressure that is placed on States to comply with the Court's requests for cooperation.
Measures to improve the efficiency of the ICC are ongoing within the Court and the ASP.
The challenge facing practitioners and policy-makers involved in the reform process is to make the necessary changes to the ICC's system of justice without jeopardising the fairness of the Court's proceedings and their significance in the eyes of victims that have suffered as a result of the commission of international crimes. This is important in light of the fact that the international reputation of the Court does not rest on productivity and cost-effectiveness alone. Of course, no matter how efficient the ICC is, the Court will
